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n the summer of 1932, a 21 year-old undergraduate at the London School n the summer of 1932, a 21 year-old undergraduate at the London School of Economics, Ronald Coase, raised a question that may at fi rst appear naive of Economics, Ronald Coase, raised a question that may at fi rst appear naive but in fact turned out to be fundamental: if the market is an effi cient method but in fact turned out to be fundamental: if the market is an effi cient method of resource allocation, then why do so many transactions take place within fi rms? of resource allocation, then why do so many transactions take place within fi rms? Coase developed verbal arguments for the existence of fi rms, in particular emphaCoase developed verbal arguments for the existence of fi rms, in particular emphasizing haggling problems in decentralized market transactions, which he thought sizing haggling problems in decentralized market transactions, which he thought authority within fi rms could partly overcome. In other words, fi rms exist because authority within fi rms could partly overcome. In other words, fi rms exist because there are costs to using the price mechanism: prices must become known, bargains there are costs to using the price mechanism: prices must become known, bargains must be made, contracts must be written. In his famous essay, Coase (1937) quotes must be made, contracts must be written. In his famous essay, Coase (1937) quotes the description of D. H. Robertson (1928, p. 85 ) that fi rms are "islands of conscious the description of D. H. Robertson (1928, p. 85 ) that fi rms are "islands of conscious power in oceans of unconsciousness like lumps of butter coagulating in buttermilk." power in oceans of unconsciousness like lumps of butter coagulating in buttermilk." If markets are so good at allocating resources, then why do fi rms exist? If markets are so good at allocating resources, then why do fi rms exist?
For a long time, these ideas were not part of models of the fi rm. Until the For a long time, these ideas were not part of models of the fi rm. Until the 1970s, the dominant theory of the fi rm was the neoclassical theory: namely, there 1970s, the dominant theory of the fi rm was the neoclassical theory: namely, there are economies of scale (or scope) which justify that production activities up to some are economies of scale (or scope) which justify that production activities up to some effi cient scale (or up to effi cient variety) be concentrated within one fi rm rather effi cient scale (or up to effi cient variety) be concentrated within one fi rm rather than scattered across multiple producers. But this approach raises a question: why than scattered across multiple producers. But this approach raises a question: why can't one get around the diseconomies of scale or scope by creating new plants can't one get around the diseconomies of scale or scope by creating new plants within the same fi rm? within the same fi rm?
Another view of the fi rm that was in fashion in the late 1970s and early 1980s Another view of the fi rm that was in fashion in the late 1970s and early 1980s was the agency view. A prominent example here is Jensen and Meckling (1976) . A was the agency view. A prominent example here is Jensen and Meckling (1976 main theme of this work is that fi rms help to solve agency problems, whether these main theme of this work is that fi rms help to solve agency problems, whether these emanate from moral hazard (the agent's action or effort is unobservable by the emanate from moral hazard (the agent's action or effort is unobservable by the principal) or from adverse selection (the agent's type is unobserved by the prinprincipal) or from adverse selection (the agent's type is unobserved by the principal). In other words, it is easier for a fi rm owner, as a principal, to monitor an cipal). In other words, it is easier for a fi rm owner, as a principal, to monitor an agent who is an employee than an agent who is an independent subcontractor. This agent who is an employee than an agent who is an independent subcontractor. This approach typically did not seek to explore why such agency problems are different approach typically did not seek to explore why such agency problems are different within and across fi rms. within and across fi rms.
In the 1970s and into the early 1980s, Oliver Williamson (for example, 1971, In the 1970s and into the early 1980s, Oliver Williamson (for example, 1971 Williamson (for example, , 1975 Williamson (for example, , 1979 made further important steps in the theory of the fi rm with his theory 1975, 1979) can become very costly when agents have to make relationship-specifi c investments. For example, suppose that an electricity generator has strong cost-based incentives For example, suppose that an electricity generator has strong cost-based incentives to locate near a coal mine. Building a new generator involves a sunk investment. to locate near a coal mine. Building a new generator involves a sunk investment. However, once this investment is sunk, the generator fi rm will fi nd itself in a bilatHowever, once this investment is sunk, the generator fi rm will fi nd itself in a bilateral monopoly situation vis-à-vis the coal mine. The electricity generator can sign eral monopoly situation vis-à-vis the coal mine. The electricity generator can sign a contract with the coal mine before investing in a generator. However, after the a contract with the coal mine before investing in a generator. However, after the generator is built, it becomes a sunk cost. The coal mine will have an incentive generator is built, it becomes a sunk cost. The coal mine will have an incentive to seek some reinterpretation or renegotiation of the contract that would allow to seek some reinterpretation or renegotiation of the contract that would allow it to receive a higher price for coal. If the electricity generator anticipates this it to receive a higher price for coal. If the electricity generator anticipates this "hold-up" situation, it may simply decide not to make the investment (for example, "hold-up" situation, it may simply decide not to make the investment (for example, Williamson, 1971, p. 116 ; see also Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978, p. 301) . Williamson, 1971, p. 116 ; see also Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978, p. 301) .
One can argue that the two parties could have written a complete contingent One can argue that the two parties could have written a complete contingent contract with adequate protections in place for both sides: for example, perhaps the contract with adequate protections in place for both sides: for example, perhaps the generator fi rm is entitled to a minimum revenue share if it makes the sunk investgenerator fi rm is entitled to a minimum revenue share if it makes the sunk investment. However, Williamson also emphasizes the existence of bargaining costs, like ment. However, Williamson also emphasizes the existence of bargaining costs, like those due to asymmetric information or moral hazard, which in turn generate those due to asymmetric information or moral hazard, which in turn generate ineffi ciencies even without initial sunk costs or relationship-specifi c investments. ineffi ciencies even without initial sunk costs or relationship-specifi c investments. Vertical integration between the generator fi rm and the coal mine is then seen by Vertical integration between the generator fi rm and the coal mine is then seen by Williamson as one way to eliminate the scope for opportunism after the contract Williamson as one way to eliminate the scope for opportunism after the contract is signed. However, Williamson's theory raises another possible question: Aren't is signed. However, Williamson's theory raises another possible question: Aren't there costs to vertical integration, not only benefi ts, which could explain why fi rms there costs to vertical integration, not only benefi ts, which could explain why fi rms have boundaries and why not all transactions are taking place within a single fi rm? have boundaries and why not all transactions are taking place within a single fi rm? Grossman and Hart (1986) used the theory of incomplete contracts to develop Grossman and Hart (1986) used the theory of incomplete contracts to develop answers to the question "What is a fi rm, and what determines its boundaries?" answers to the question "What is a fi rm, and what determines its boundaries?" in their path-breaking paper on the costs and benefi ts of vertical integration. in their path-breaking paper on the costs and benefi ts of vertical integration. Perhaps the central issue is that economic actors are only boundedly rational and Perhaps the central issue is that economic actors are only boundedly rational and cannot anticipate all possible contingencies. It might well be that certain states of cannot anticipate all possible contingencies. It might well be that certain states of nature or actions cannot be verifi ed by third parties after they arise, like certain nature or actions cannot be verifi ed by third parties after they arise, like certain qualities of a good to be traded in the future, and thus cannot be written into an qualities of a good to be traded in the future, and thus cannot be written into an enforceable contract. When contracts are incomplete, and consequently not all enforceable contract. When contracts are incomplete, and consequently not all uses of an asset can be specifi ed in advance, any contract negotiated in advance uses of an asset can be specifi ed in advance, any contract negotiated in advance must leave some discretion over the use of the assets; and the "owner" of the must leave some discretion over the use of the assets; and the "owner" of the fi rm is the party to whom the residual rights of control have been allocated at fi rm is the party to whom the residual rights of control have been allocated at the contracting stage. Grossman and Hart argue persuasively that the optimal the contracting stage. Grossman and Hart argue persuasively that the optimal allocation of property rights-or governance structure-is one that minimizes allocation of property rights-or governance structure-is one that minimizes effi ciency losses. Thus, in a situation where party A's investment is more important effi ciency losses. Thus, in a situation where party A's investment is more important than party B's investment, it is optimal to allocate property rights over the assets than party B's investment, it is optimal to allocate property rights over the assets to party A, even if this discourages investment by party to party A, even if this discourages investment by party B. More generally, the . More generally, the incomplete contracts/property rights approach produces a theory of ownership incomplete contracts/property rights approach produces a theory of ownership and vertical integration. It also directly addresses the question of what is a fi rm. and vertical integration. It also directly addresses the question of what is a fi rm. Grossman and Hart argue that a fi rm is a collection of assets over which the owner Grossman and Hart argue that a fi rm is a collection of assets over which the owner has residual control rights. has residual control rights.
In the fi rst section of this paper, we spell out Grossman and Hart's argument In the fi rst section of this paper, we spell out Grossman and Hart's argument using a simple numerical example, then we show how the incomplete contracts using a simple numerical example, then we show how the incomplete contracts approach can be extended beyond the fi rms' boundaries issue to analyze fi rms' approach can be extended beyond the fi rms' boundaries issue to analyze fi rms' internal organization; fi rms' fi nancial decisions; the costs and benefi ts from privainternal organization; fi rms' fi nancial decisions; the costs and benefi ts from privatization; and the organization of international trade between inter-and intrafi rm tization; and the organization of international trade between inter-and intrafi rm trade. In the second section, we discuss several criticisms of the incomplete trade. In the second section, we discuss several criticisms of the incomplete contracts/property rights methodology, especially what we call the "implementation contracts/property rights methodology, especially what we call the "implementation criticism," and then we briefl y review some recent developments of the incomplete criticism," and then we briefl y review some recent developments of the incomplete contracts approach. We have deliberately chosen to be selective in our discussion contracts approach. We have deliberately chosen to be selective in our discussion of the literature, and thus we focus on a small number of contributions; for a more of the literature, and thus we focus on a small number of contributions; for a more complete overview, interested readers might begin with the references in Bolton complete overview, interested readers might begin with the references in Bolton and Dewatripont (2004) , Salanie (1997) , and Tirole (2006). and Dewatripont (2004) , Salanie (1997) , and Tirole (2006) .
Incomplete Contracts and Vertical Integration: An Example Incomplete Contracts and Vertical Integration: An Example
We now present an example that illustrates these issues in the spirit of the main We now present an example that illustrates these issues in the spirit of the main arguments of Grossman and Hart (1986) . It is also similar to the trading setting arguments of Grossman and Hart (1986) . It is also similar to the trading setting explored in Hart and Moore (1988) . explored in Hart and Moore (1988) .
Consider the relationship between a Consider the relationship between a B(uyer) and a (uyer) and a S(eller) of an interme-(eller) of an intermediate good, which we will call a "widget." diate good, which we will call a "widget." B can use the widget to produce a fi nal can use the widget to produce a fi nal good which can be sold to a consumer. The consumer values the fi nal good at good which can be sold to a consumer. The consumer values the fi nal good at v. . S can make a privately costly investment that makes the widget cheaper to produce.
can make a privately costly investment that makes the widget cheaper to produce. We can think of this as enhancing the widget-producing machine. If We can think of this as enhancing the widget-producing machine. If S makes the makes the investment, which costs $5, then the widget can be produced for $10, otherwise investment, which costs $5, then the widget can be produced for $10, otherwise it costs $16 to produce. it costs $16 to produce. B can make a privately costly investment which makes can make a privately costly investment which makes the fi nal good more valuable to the consumer. We can think of this as enhancing the fi nal good more valuable to the consumer. We can think of this as enhancing the fi nal good-producing machine. This investment also costs $5. If the fi nal good-producing machine. This investment also costs $5. If B makes makes the investment, then the investment, then v = = $40; otherwise $40; otherwise v = = $32. Note that only $32. Note that only B can make the can make the revenue enhancement investment, and only revenue enhancement investment, and only S can make the cost reduction investcan make the cost reduction investment. This assumption might be justifi ed, for example, if ment. This assumption might be justifi ed, for example, if B and and S have different have different human capital characteristics. human capital characteristics.
B and and S would like to write a contract that specifi es that each party should make would like to write a contract that specifi es that each party should make its respective investment, because that leads the total surplus in the relationship to its respective investment, because that leads the total surplus in the relationship to be 40 -10 -5 -5 be 40 -10 -5 -5 = = 20-that is, the fi nal good is sold for 40, it costs 10 to produce, 20-that is, the fi nal good is sold for 40, it costs 10 to produce, and and B and and S each incur an investment cost of 5. But suppose that the two parties each incur an investment cost of 5. But suppose that the two parties cannot contract on the widget, nor can they contract on a cost-sharing rule in cannot contract on the widget, nor can they contract on a cost-sharing rule in advance, nor can they contract on the investments. advance, nor can they contract on the investments. Since Since B and and S cannot contract on the widget nor on a sharing rule before cannot contract on the widget nor on a sharing rule before investments are made, they will have to bargain about the price that investments are made, they will have to bargain about the price that B pays to pays to S for for the widget after the investment stage. Suppose that the widget after the investment stage. Suppose that B and and S are nonintegrated so are nonintegrated so that at the bargaining stage they split whatever surplus is generated 50:50. that at the bargaining stage they split whatever surplus is generated 50:50. 's machine that produces the fi nal good. S no longer needs to bargain with no longer needs to bargain with B because because S owns the machine. Therefore, owns the machine. Therefore, S will receive the entire increased surplus will receive the entire increased surplus from investing in cost reduction (that is 16 -10 -5) and thus will be prepared to from investing in cost reduction (that is 16 -10 -5) and thus will be prepared to invest. However invest. However B will not invest as will not invest as B will get none of the benefi t of making the fi nal will get none of the benefi t of making the fi nal good more valuable. good more valuable. S cannot compel cannot compel B to invest, nor contract on to invest, nor contract on B making the making the investment. Total surplus is thus 32 -10 -5 = 17; this is larger than under noninteinvestment. Total surplus is thus 32 -10 -5 = 17; this is larger than under nonintegration, so forward vertical integration is desirable. gration, so forward vertical integration is desirable.
In fact, In fact, B ownership (backward integration), does better still. Now ownership (backward integration), does better still. Now B invests, invests, but but S does not, yielding total surplus of 40 -16 -5 does not, yielding total surplus of 40 -16 -5 = = 19. This is not as good as if 19. This is not as good as if contracting was possible (that would yield a surplus of 20), but it is better than the contracting was possible (that would yield a surplus of 20), but it is better than the other possible ownership structures. What makes other possible ownership structures. What makes B ownership preferable to ownership preferable to S owner-ownership is that ship is that B's investment is relatively more important (at the margin) than 's investment is relatively more important (at the margin) than S's. Both 's. Both cost 5; but cost 5; but B's has a benefi t of 40 -32 's has a benefi t of 40 -32 = = 8; whereas 8; whereas S's has a benefi t of 16 -10 's has a benefi t of 16 -10 = = 6. 6. This example highlights two of the key Grossman-Hart (1986) insights. First, in This example highlights two of the key Grossman-Hart (1986) insights. First, in a world of incomplete contracts, asset ownership can help to mitigate ineffi ciencies a world of incomplete contracts, asset ownership can help to mitigate ineffi ciencies that would otherwise arise from underinvestment in productive activities. Second, that would otherwise arise from underinvestment in productive activities. Second, the party whose marginal investment is more productive should own the assets. the party whose marginal investment is more productive should own the assets. Because asset ownership presumably can be contracted upon, we would expect Because asset ownership presumably can be contracted upon, we would expect B ownership to emerge as the equilibrium ownership structure as it maximizes joint ownership to emerge as the equilibrium ownership structure as it maximizes joint 1 In particular, although B and S can tell whether the investments have been made-these investments are "observable" to B and S-a third party like a court of law or an arbitrator cannot determine whether the investments have been made, and so the investments are not "verifi able." For example, the court or other third party does not have the requisite technical knowledge to determine whether the investments have been made. 2 This split arises in a situation of Nash bargaining because B cannot produce the fi nal good without the widget from S, and S has no use for the widget if it is not sold to B. Therefore, both B and S have zero outside options. 3 The general rule is that control should be allocated to increase the investment by the party whose marginal investment is more productive, where the incentive for such investment is rooted in the difference in threat-point payoffs. In this example, both sides have a threat point of zero. That is, they can only choose not to participate. If one or more parties can threaten to take an alternative action with some positive value, then this choice will need to be taken into account. economic surplus. This provides a theory of the nature and extent of vertical (and economic surplus. This provides a theory of the nature and extent of vertical (and lateral) integration. lateral) integration.
As we will see in the next section, incomplete contract theory does more than As we will see in the next section, incomplete contract theory does more than that: it provides a framework for thinking about a host of issues where relationshipthat: it provides a framework for thinking about a host of issues where relationshipspecifi c investments are important to economic effi ciency. specifi c investments are important to economic effi ciency.
Other Implications of the Incomplete Contracts Approach Other Implications of the Incomplete Contracts Approach Delegation and Authority in Organizations Delegation and Authority in Organizations
When looking at the allocation of decision rights inside the fi rm, what matters When looking at the allocation of decision rights inside the fi rm, what matters primarily is not so much (or only) asset ownership, but more directly how formal primarily is not so much (or only) asset ownership, but more directly how formal and real authority are distributed down the hierarchy. What distinguishes real from and real authority are distributed down the hierarchy. What distinguishes real from formal authority is that taking decisions requires acquisition of information, which formal authority is that taking decisions requires acquisition of information, which in turn requires time and effort. Thus, for example, the chief executive offi cer of in turn requires time and effort. Thus, for example, the chief executive offi cer of a big holding can only devote limited attention to each unit, which in turn implies a big holding can only devote limited attention to each unit, which in turn implies that more real authority will lie with downstream agents in each unit. More generthat more real authority will lie with downstream agents in each unit. More generally, the design of the organization, together with the allocation of formal decision ally, the design of the organization, together with the allocation of formal decision rights, will determine how real authority is distributed within the fi rm. The issue rights, will determine how real authority is distributed within the fi rm. The issue of real versus formal authority and of the implications of this distinction for the of real versus formal authority and of the implications of this distinction for the optimal design of fi rms' organizations is addressed by Aghion and Tirole (1997) optimal design of fi rms' organizations is addressed by Aghion and Tirole (1997) using an incomplete contracts approach. using an incomplete contracts approach.
Their basic framework involves two parties: Their basic framework involves two parties: P(principal) and (principal) and A(agent). In this (agent). In this model, model, formal authority can be allocated contractually: for example, shareholders can be allocated contractually: for example, shareholders allocate formal authority to a board of directors. By contrast, allocate formal authority to a board of directors. By contrast, real authority is exerted is exerted either by the party which enjoys formal authority if that party also has the informaeither by the party which enjoys formal authority if that party also has the information or by the other party if only the other party has the information. Contractual tion or by the other party if only the other party has the information. Contractual incompleteness is again key to the whole analysis: any formal agreement (that is, any incompleteness is again key to the whole analysis: any formal agreement (that is, any contract signed) between contract signed) between P and and A cannot specify particular project choices, as these cannot specify particular project choices, as these are not verifi able by third parties. are not verifi able by third parties.
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After the contract is signed, both After the contract is signed, both P and and A can invest in information acquisition:
can invest in information acquisition: by investing effort ½ by investing effort ½E 2 2 , , P acquires, with probability acquires, with probability E, the relevant information to , the relevant information to make a decision. Similarly, by investing effort ½ make a decision. Similarly, by investing effort ½e 2 2 , , A acquires, with probability acquires, with probability e, the , the relevant information to make a decision. An important parameter in the analysis of relevant information to make a decision. An important parameter in the analysis of the costs and benefi ts of delegating formal (or real) authority to the costs and benefi ts of delegating formal (or real) authority to A, is the degree , is the degree of congruence between of congruence between P's and 's and A's preferences. Let 's preferences. Let α α denote the probability that denote the probability that P's preferred project is also 's preferred project is also A's preferred project (we say that there is "congruence" 's preferred project (we say that there is "congruence" between the two parties' preferences), and suppose that a party gets utility zero if between the two parties' preferences), and suppose that a party gets utility zero if the other party chooses its preferred project and preferences are not congruent. the other party chooses its preferred project and preferences are not congruent.
Finally, we assume that an uninformed party will never pick a project at random, as Finally, we assume that an uninformed party will never pick a project at random, as this might be too risky. this might be too risky.
The timing of moves is as follows. First, the two parties sign a contract that allocates The timing of moves is as follows. First, the two parties sign a contract that allocates formal authority to one party, either formal authority to one party, either P or or A. Then, both parties decide how much effort . Then, both parties decide how much effort to invest in acquisition of information. Deciding to invest nothing in information is a to invest in acquisition of information. Deciding to invest nothing in information is a possible choice. In the next step, the party with no formal authority proposes a project possible choice. In the next step, the party with no formal authority proposes a project to the party with formal authority. If the party with formal authority has acquired inforto the party with formal authority. If the party with formal authority has acquired information, then the party with formal authority picks its own preferred project. If the mation, then the party with formal authority picks its own preferred project. If the party with formal authority has not acquired information, then it accepts the project party with formal authority has not acquired information, then it accepts the project submitted by the party without formal authority. In this latter case, real authority differs submitted by the party without formal authority. In this latter case, real authority differs from formal authority, since the party with formal authority is uninformed and therefrom formal authority, since the party with formal authority is uninformed and therefore can only rubber-stamp the other party's project proposal. fore can only rubber-stamp the other party's project proposal.
In this setting, for a principal In this setting, for a principal P to delegate formal authority to an agent to delegate formal authority to an agent A involves a cost and a benefi t. The cost is that the agent may choose a project that the involves a cost and a benefi t. The cost is that the agent may choose a project that the principal does not like. This is the principal does not like. This is the loss of control effect. The benefi t is that delegating . The benefi t is that delegating formal authority to the agent encourages that agent to invest more effort in informaformal authority to the agent encourages that agent to invest more effort in information acquisition. This is the tion acquisition. This is the initiative effect. Which effect dominates will depend on a . Which effect dominates will depend on a key parameter: the extent of congruence between the preferences of the principal key parameter: the extent of congruence between the preferences of the principal and the agent. If the preferences of the principal are not especially congruent with and the agent. If the preferences of the principal are not especially congruent with those of the agent, then the principal retains formal control; if their preferences are those of the agent, then the principal retains formal control; if their preferences are reasonably congruent, the principal is more likely to formally delegate authority. reasonably congruent, the principal is more likely to formally delegate authority.
The choices posed by the model as described to this point may be too stark: after The choices posed by the model as described to this point may be too stark: after all, most corporate principals do not completely hand over formal authority, but they all, most corporate principals do not completely hand over formal authority, but they do want their agents to carry out most of the information gathering. For example, it do want their agents to carry out most of the information gathering. For example, it could be that delegating formal authority to could be that delegating formal authority to A is potentially too costly for is potentially too costly for P, perhaps , perhaps because of the real if small probability that because of the real if small probability that A might take some very costly action. In might take some very costly action. In that case, that case, P will always want to retain formal authority and yet may want to commit not will always want to retain formal authority and yet may want to commit not to invest too much in information acquisition, so as to preserve the agent's incentives to invest too much in information acquisition, so as to preserve the agent's incentives to gather information, even though the agent recognizes the possibility of being overto gather information, even though the agent recognizes the possibility of being overruled. One way to achieve such commitment is through the choice of span of control. ruled. One way to achieve such commitment is through the choice of span of control. A principal might deliberately limit how much effort he will devote to acquiring infor-A principal might deliberately limit how much effort he will devote to acquiring information on each particular activity, for example, by having a larger number of agents mation on each particular activity, for example, by having a larger number of agents and activities under supervision. This in turn will encourage initiative by agents on and activities under supervision. This in turn will encourage initiative by agents on each activity, as they anticipate that the principal will ignore their proposals less often. each activity, as they anticipate that the principal will ignore their proposals less often. Of course, the choice of the optimal span of control by the principal is subject to the Of course, the choice of the optimal span of control by the principal is subject to the same trade-off as above, namely between the principal's loss of control and the agents' same trade-off as above, namely between the principal's loss of control and the agents' initiatives. This trade-off underlies not only the choice of span of control, but other initiatives. This trade-off underlies not only the choice of span of control, but other features of organizational design, such as the role of intermediaries, the costs and features of organizational design, such as the role of intermediaries, the costs and benefi ts of having multiple principals on some activities, or the optimal combination benefi ts of having multiple principals on some activities, or the optimal combination of tasks within teams. of tasks within teams.
An Economic Justifi cation for Debt An Economic Justifi cation for Debt
Many fi rms are fi nanced with a combination of equity and debt, and the choice Many fi rms are fi nanced with a combination of equity and debt, and the choice of fi nancial structure matters a lot in practice. However, a benchmark contribution of fi nancial structure matters a lot in practice. However, a benchmark contribution in corporate fi nance is the well-known Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem, which in corporate fi nance is the well-known Modigliani-Miller (1958) theorem, which says roughly that in a world without transaction costs and without taxes, the mix of says roughly that in a world without transaction costs and without taxes, the mix of debt and equity-and more generally the fi rm's fi nancial structure-does not affect debt and equity-and more generally the fi rm's fi nancial structure-does not affect the total value of a fi rm. Ever since Modigliani and Miller stated their irrelevance the total value of a fi rm. Ever since Modigliani and Miller stated their irrelevance result, economists have sought explanations for why fi nancial structure matters result, economists have sought explanations for why fi nancial structure matters after all. A common explanation is that (in violation of the Modigliani-Miller after all. A common explanation is that (in violation of the Modigliani-Miller assumptions) debt has certain tax advantages, in that interest payments on debt are assumptions) debt has certain tax advantages, in that interest payments on debt are typically tax deductible, but dividend payments are not. However, this answer seems typically tax deductible, but dividend payments are not. However, this answer seems partial at best, because corporate debt was prevalent even before corporate income partial at best, because corporate debt was prevalent even before corporate income tax existed. Aghion and Bolton (1992) use the incomplete contracts approach to tax existed. Aghion and Bolton (1992) use the incomplete contracts approach to offer an alternative rationale for debt versus equity fi nancing. In a nutshell, debt offer an alternative rationale for debt versus equity fi nancing. In a nutshell, debt fi nancing provides a contingent and thus more-fl exible governance structure for fi nancing provides a contingent and thus more-fl exible governance structure for fi rms, one which is more responsive to whether good or bad states of the world fi rms, one which is more responsive to whether good or bad states of the world materialize in the future. materialize in the future.
Consider the example of a family business that is run by an entrepreneur Consider the example of a family business that is run by an entrepreneur who has ideas but no wealth to fi nance them and therefore needs fi nancing from who has ideas but no wealth to fi nance them and therefore needs fi nancing from an outside investor. The entrepreneur derives private benefi ts from running and an outside investor. The entrepreneur derives private benefi ts from running and expanding the family business-think of the entrepreneur as an empire builder. expanding the family business-think of the entrepreneur as an empire builder. On the other hand, the investor seeks (short-run) monetary returns from investing On the other hand, the investor seeks (short-run) monetary returns from investing in this business. Then one can look at the following three governance structures, in this business. Then one can look at the following three governance structures, which correspond to three different types of fi nancial contracts: 1) full entreprewhich correspond to three different types of fi nancial contracts: 1) full entrepreneur control, for example when the outside investor only holds nonvoting shares; neur control, for example when the outside investor only holds nonvoting shares; 2) full investor control, when the investor holds all the voting equity in the fi rm; and 2) full investor control, when the investor holds all the voting equity in the fi rm; and 3) contingent control, whereby the entrepreneur has control if revenues are high 3) contingent control, whereby the entrepreneur has control if revenues are high (call it the good state of nature) and the investor has control if revenues are low (call it the good state of nature) and the investor has control if revenues are low (call it the bad state of nature). In the Aghion and Bolton (1992) model, the timing (call it the bad state of nature). In the Aghion and Bolton (1992) model, the timing of the relationship between the entrepreneur and the investor can be described as of the relationship between the entrepreneur and the investor can be described as follows: At the contracting stage, the two parties write a fi nancial contract which follows: At the contracting stage, the two parties write a fi nancial contract which allocates control rights. Then the state of nature is realized, and suppose that either allocates control rights. Then the state of nature is realized, and suppose that either a good state or a bad state can occur. The state of nature that occurs is verifi able by a good state or a bad state can occur. The state of nature that occurs is verifi able by a third party. At this stage, an action must be chosen, like whether to pursue and a third party. At this stage, an action must be chosen, like whether to pursue and expand the business or whether to close it down. If the good state arises, the entreexpand the business or whether to close it down. If the good state arises, the entrepreneur will want to expand, whereas the investor may seek outright repayment. preneur will want to expand, whereas the investor may seek outright repayment. If the bad state arises and losses are occurring, the entrepreneur will still want to If the bad state arises and losses are occurring, the entrepreneur will still want to continue, whereas the investor will want to stop the losses, perhaps by liquidating continue, whereas the investor will want to stop the losses, perhaps by liquidating the company. In other words, while both entrepreneurs and investors want to make the company. In other words, while both entrepreneurs and investors want to make money, entrepreneurs will often place a higher value on the continuation of the money, entrepreneurs will often place a higher value on the continuation of the fi rm, while investors are more likely than the entrepreneur to prefer pulling money fi rm, while investors are more likely than the entrepreneur to prefer pulling money out of the fi rm in a good state or closing it down in a bad state. out of the fi rm in a good state or closing it down in a bad state.
Under full entrepreneur control, the investor faces the risk of incurring large Under full entrepreneur control, the investor faces the risk of incurring large losses if the bad state occurs. Anticipating this, the investor may simply refuse losses if the bad state occurs. Anticipating this, the investor may simply refuse to fi nance the fi rm's investment through nonvoting shares. Under full investor to fi nance the fi rm's investment through nonvoting shares. Under full investor control, the investor is protected against the risk of large losses if the bad state control, the investor is protected against the risk of large losses if the bad state occurs (in particular, the investor can always decide to liquidate the fi rm in the bad occurs (in particular, the investor can always decide to liquidate the fi rm in the bad state). But the downside of full investor control is that the investor can also impose a state). But the downside of full investor control is that the investor can also impose a suboptimal course of action in the good state (namely, the investor can prevent the suboptimal course of action in the good state (namely, the investor can prevent the entrepreneur from expanding the business in that state), and the wealth-constrained entrepreneur from expanding the business in that state), and the wealth-constrained entrepreneur has no cash at its disposal to compensate the investor for not doing so. entrepreneur has no cash at its disposal to compensate the investor for not doing so.
Thus, contingent control through debt fi nancing offers a good compromise, as Thus, contingent control through debt fi nancing offers a good compromise, as it allows the entrepreneur to maintain control over the business in the good state, it allows the entrepreneur to maintain control over the business in the good state, while in the bad state, control will be transferred to the investor who can then make while in the bad state, control will be transferred to the investor who can then make sure that the fi rm will be liquidated in that state if losses from continuation become sure that the fi rm will be liquidated in that state if losses from continuation become too large. Essentially, the investor receives protection against the investment leading too large. Essentially, the investor receives protection against the investment leading to large losses in the bad state, while the entrepreneur has the security of keeping to large losses in the bad state, while the entrepreneur has the security of keeping control, and therefore not having a suboptimal course of action imposed, in the control, and therefore not having a suboptimal course of action imposed, in the good state. good state.
Public versus Private Ownership Public versus Private Ownership
There is a long-standing dispute over whether government payment for a There is a long-standing dispute over whether government payment for a certain activity should imply government ownership of that activity. Most people certain activity should imply government ownership of that activity. Most people agree that there are some things for which government should pay (such as infraagree that there are some things for which government should pay (such as infrastructure). Less clear, however, is why government should own things. For instance, structure). Less clear, however, is why government should own things. For instance, schools could be owned by fi rms, and government could give students vouchers schools could be owned by fi rms, and government could give students vouchers that pay for the cost of education. Prisons too could be owned by private fi rms. that pay for the cost of education. Prisons too could be owned by private fi rms. With some creativity, national defense and police services could be provided by With some creativity, national defense and police services could be provided by private fi rms. On the other hand, Medicare and Medicaid services could also be private fi rms. On the other hand, Medicare and Medicaid services could also be provided by a network of government-employed doctors. Government ownership provided by a network of government-employed doctors. Government ownership is highly prevalent in certain sectors of the economy, and almost absent in others. is highly prevalent in certain sectors of the economy, and almost absent in others. What factors determine the government make-or-buy decision? What factors determine the government make-or-buy decision? Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) analyze an incomplete contracts/property Hart, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) analyze an incomplete contracts/property rights model to address this issue. rights model to address this issue. 5 5 They use the example of prisons to illustrate They use the example of prisons to illustrate their reasoning. In their model, there are two possible investments that can be made their reasoning. In their model, there are two possible investments that can be made in prisons: one reduces costs, the other improves quality. Improvements in quality in prisons: one reduces costs, the other improves quality. Improvements in quality might include rehabilitating prisoners, treating them humanely, and reducing the might include rehabilitating prisoners, treating them humanely, and reducing the chance of escaping. Lower costs come with a trade-off: they involve somewhat lower chance of escaping. Lower costs come with a trade-off: they involve somewhat lower quality. For example, perhaps reductions in cost make escapes or within-prison quality. For example, perhaps reductions in cost make escapes or within-prison violence more likely. In a world of perfect contracting, the government and a violence more likely. In a world of perfect contracting, the government and a private prison provider could write a contract that stipulates the desired level of private prison provider could write a contract that stipulates the desired level of investments in cost reduction and quality improvement. However, with contractual investments in cost reduction and quality improvement. However, with contractual incompleteness, this choice is not possible. incompleteness, this choice is not possible.
Consider the case of a prison that is owned by a private contractor. In their Consider the case of a prison that is owned by a private contractor. In their model, the private contractor bears the investment costs. However, the contractor model, the private contractor bears the investment costs. However, the contractor will only get benefi ts from cost reduction, whereas the government will suffer all the will only get benefi ts from cost reduction, whereas the government will suffer all the deterioration in quality that comes from cost reduction. The socially effi cient levels deterioration in quality that comes from cost reduction. The socially effi cient levels of investment would involve equating the marginal benefi ts and marginal costs of of investment would involve equating the marginal benefi ts and marginal costs of these two kinds of investment. Yet, a privately owned prison will overemphasize cost these two kinds of investment. Yet, a privately owned prison will overemphasize cost reduction relative to the social optimum. reduction relative to the social optimum. Now consider government ownership with the contractor being an employee Now consider government ownership with the contractor being an employee called the "warden." In this model, the warden again bears the investment costs (in called the "warden." In this model, the warden again bears the investment costs (in time and effort) of maintaining a high-quality prison. However, with government time and effort) of maintaining a high-quality prison. However, with government ownership, the government and the warden split the benefi ts coming from cost reducownership, the government and the warden split the benefi ts coming from cost reduction and quality innovation, and also split the deleterious effects that cost reductions tion and quality innovation, and also split the deleterious effects that cost reductions have on quality. In this setting, because the warden bears the investment costs but have on quality. In this setting, because the warden bears the investment costs but receives only some of the benefi ts, both cost reduction effort and quality improvereceives only some of the benefi ts, both cost reduction effort and quality improvement effort are too low compared to the social optimum, but at least the contractor ment effort are too low compared to the social optimum, but at least the contractor will underinvest in quality less than if the contractor had remained the private owner will underinvest in quality less than if the contractor had remained the private owner of the prison. of the prison.
In this model, both private contracting and government ownership are subopIn this model, both private contracting and government ownership are suboptimal, albeit in different ways, and the choice between them will depend on how timal, albeit in different ways, and the choice between them will depend on how society perceives the relative benefi ts of quality and cost. society perceives the relative benefi ts of quality and cost.
International Trade International Trade
Antras (2003) notes that around one-third of all international trade is intrafi rm Antras (2003) notes that around one-third of all international trade is intrafi rm and that the bulk of that trade is in capital-intensive industries. This striking fact and that the bulk of that trade is in capital-intensive industries. This striking fact raises the question of why capital-intensive goods have a greater tendency to be raises the question of why capital-intensive goods have a greater tendency to be traded within the boundaries of (multinational) fi rms, while labor-intensive goods traded within the boundaries of (multinational) fi rms, while labor-intensive goods have a greater tendency to be traded between fi rms. have a greater tendency to be traded between fi rms.
In the Antras (2003) model, a fi nal-good producer In the Antras (2003) model, a fi nal-good producer F decides how to organize decides how to organize production. Production of the fi nal good production. Production of the fi nal good y uses two specialized inputs: a capitaluses two specialized inputs: a capitalintensive input intensive input h and a labor-intensive input and a labor-intensive input m. The fi nal-good producer . The fi nal-good producer F supplies supplies the capital-intensive input the capital-intensive input h and produces the fi nal good and produces the fi nal good y, whereas another agent whereas another agent denoted by denoted by S supplies the labor-intensive input supplies the labor-intensive input m. The two agents are located in . The two agents are located in different countries: as one example, think of different countries: as one example, think of F as being located in the United States as being located in the United States and and S as located in China. as located in China. As in our example in the previous section, investments in As in our example in the previous section, investments in h and and m are not are not contractible. The initial contract determines the governance structure, which in contractible. The initial contract determines the governance structure, which in this case will either involve ownership by this case will either involve ownership by F or outsourcing (this model does not or outsourcing (this model does not consider ownership by consider ownership by S). Ownership in turn determines the outside options of ). Ownership in turn determines the outside options of F and and S in bargaining after a contract has been signed. Under outsourcing, a contracin bargaining after a contract has been signed. Under outsourcing, a contractual breach gives 0 to both agents; under integration, tual breach gives 0 to both agents; under integration, F can seize the input can seize the input m, but , but this choice imposes a cost that reduces output. this choice imposes a cost that reduces output.
As in the earlier example, the (constrained) effi cient choice is to allocate As in the earlier example, the (constrained) effi cient choice is to allocate ownership to the party undertaking the relatively more-important investment. It ownership to the party undertaking the relatively more-important investment. It then follows that when production is labor-intensive, outsourcing is the optimal then follows that when production is labor-intensive, outsourcing is the optimal governance structure; when production is capital-intensive, vertical integration governance structure; when production is capital-intensive, vertical integration dominates. Thus, the model predicts a higher propensity to integrate suppliers in dominates. Thus, the model predicts a higher propensity to integrate suppliers in capital-intensive sectors, which in turn explains the observed positive cross-industry capital-intensive sectors, which in turn explains the observed positive cross-industry correlation between capital intensity and the share of intrafi rm imports in total correlation between capital intensity and the share of intrafi rm imports in total U.S. imports. U.S. imports. Antras (2005) uses a similar framework to explain why product cycles lead Antras (2005) uses a similar framework to explain why product cycles lead to "organizational cycles" whereby manufacturing fi rst takes place within the to "organizational cycles" whereby manufacturing fi rst takes place within the boundaries of multinational enterprises before subsequently being outsourced to boundaries of multinational enterprises before subsequently being outsourced to independent foreign fi rms. The intuition is as follows: in the early stage of a product independent foreign fi rms. The intuition is as follows: in the early stage of a product cycle, the involvement of headquarters is important, and thus the potential gain cycle, the involvement of headquarters is important, and thus the potential gain from lower wages in southern China is not suffi cient for the fi nal producer to use from lower wages in southern China is not suffi cient for the fi nal producer to use manufacturing input manufacturing input m from China. Thus, both inputs will be supplied in the United from China. Thus, both inputs will be supplied in the United States. At an intermediate stage of the product cycle, the U.S. headquarters will use States. At an intermediate stage of the product cycle, the U.S. headquarters will use input input m from China but maintain ownership rights-and thus produce within a from China but maintain ownership rights-and thus produce within a multinational enterprise. Eventually, when the product has become fully standardmultinational enterprise. Eventually, when the product has become fully standardized, lower wages in China justify that ized, lower wages in China justify that m be supplied by China, and outsourcing will be supplied by China, and outsourcing will be more effi cient than integration. be more effi cient than integration.
Foundations, Extensions, and Future Research Foundations, Extensions, and Future Research
A basic premise of property rights theory is that there is some information that is A basic premise of property rights theory is that there is some information that is observable to the contracting parties but not verifi able by a court, so that contracts are observable to the contracting parties but not verifi able by a court, so that contracts are necessarily incomplete and property rights matter. This premise was sharply questioned necessarily incomplete and property rights matter. This premise was sharply questioned by Tirole (1999a, 1999b) , who suggested that observable information can by Tirole (1999a, 1999b) , who suggested that observable information can be made verifi able by the use of cleverly designed revelation mechanisms. be made verifi able by the use of cleverly designed revelation mechanisms. 6 6 That is, the That is, the contracting parties can agree in advance to play a game where they have the approcontracting parties can agree in advance to play a game where they have the appropriate incentives to reveal truthfully their private information in equilibrium. However, priate incentives to reveal truthfully their private information in equilibrium. However, these mechanisms are never observed in practice, which begs the question: Why not? these mechanisms are never observed in practice, which begs the question: Why not?
In this section, we fi rst discuss the robustness of incomplete contracts/property In this section, we fi rst discuss the robustness of incomplete contracts/property rights theory to using complex revelation mechanisms that seek to bring out true rights theory to using complex revelation mechanisms that seek to bring out true preferences. We then analyze incomplete contracts in a setting where parties have preferences. We then analyze incomplete contracts in a setting where parties have reference points as to what they believe is fair. Finally, we discuss attempts to make reference points as to what they believe is fair. Finally, we discuss attempts to make the degree of contractual completeness endogenous, potentially depending on the degree of contractual completeness endogenous, potentially depending on factors like the learning ability of parties, bargaining power, discount rates, and other factors like the learning ability of parties, bargaining power, discount rates, and other factors. Each of these approaches suggests possible avenues for future research. factors. Each of these approaches suggests possible avenues for future research.
Revelation Mechanisms Revelation Mechanisms
Here, we begin with an example of a revelation mechanism that is drawn from Here, we begin with an example of a revelation mechanism that is drawn from Aghion, Fudenberg, Holden, Kunimoto, and Tercieux (2010) . There are two parties, Aghion, Fudenberg, Holden, Kunimoto, and Tercieux (2010) . There are two parties, a buyer a buyer B and a seller and a seller S of a single unit of an indivisible good. If trade occurs, then of a single unit of an indivisible good. If trade occurs, then B's 's payoff is payoff is V B B = = θ θ --p; where ; where θ θ is the value of the good to the buyer and is the value of the good to the buyer and p is the price. is the price. S's 's payoff is just payoff is just V S S = = p. The good can be of either high or low quality. If it is of high quality, . The good can be of either high or low quality. If it is of high quality, then then B values it at 14; if it is of low quality, then values it at 14; if it is of low quality, then B values it at 10, thus values it at 10, thus θ θ ∈ ∈ {10, {10, --14}. 14}.
Suppose that the quality Suppose that the quality θ θ representing the true value of the good to the buyer representing the true value of the good to the buyer is observable and common knowledge to both parties. Even though is observable and common knowledge to both parties. Even though θ θ is not verifiis not verifiable by a court, and therefore no initial contract between the two parties can be able by a court, and therefore no initial contract between the two parties can be made credibly contingent upon made credibly contingent upon θ θ, truthful revelation of , truthful revelation of θ θ by the buyer by the buyer B can still can still be achieved through the following mechanism: be achieved through the following mechanism:
1. B announces θ θ to be either "high" or "low." If he announces "high," then B pays S a price equal to 14 and the game then stops.
2. If B announces "low" and S does not "challenge" B's announcement, then B pays a price equal to 10 and the game stops. When the true value of the good is common knowledge between B and S, this mechanism yields truth telling as the unique (subgame perfect) equilibrium. To see this, let the true valuation be 14; and let F = 9: If B announces "high," then B pays 14 and we stop. If, however, B announces "low," then S will challenge because, at stage 3a, B pays 9 to T and, this cost being sunk, B will still accept the good for 6 at stage 3b (because it is worth 14 and 14 -6 = 8 is greater than 14/2 = 7, which is what B gets if it rejects the offer of 6). Anticipating this, S knows that by challenging B, S receives 9 + 6 = 15, which is greater than the 10 that S would receive if S did not challenge. Moving back to stage 1, if B lies and announces θ = 10 when the true state is θ = 14, B gets 14 -9 -6 = -1, whereas B gets 14 -14 = 0 if B tells the truth.
These kinds of revelation mechanisms are never observed in practice. Why not? These kinds of revelation mechanisms are never observed in practice. Why not? One possible explanation is that these mechanisms are not robust to even small One possible explanation is that these mechanisms are not robust to even small deviations from common knowledge. Strict common knowledge is a demanding deviations from common knowledge. Strict common knowledge is a demanding requirement, and unlikely to be true in practice. It requires that party requirement, and unlikely to be true in practice. It requires that party A knows it, knows it, party party B knows it, party knows it, party A knows that party knows that party B knows it, and so on ad infi nitum, all with knows it, and so on ad infi nitum, all with perfect certainty. In Aghion, Fudenberg, Holden, Kunimoto, and Tercieux (2010) , perfect certainty. In Aghion, Fudenberg, Holden, Kunimoto, and Tercieux (2010) , we ask whether the above type of mechanism still works in a situation that is only we ask whether the above type of mechanism still works in a situation that is only close to common knowledge: that is, party close to common knowledge: that is, party A knows it, party knows it, party B knows it, party knows it, party A knows that party knows that party B knows it, and so on ad infi nitum, but in each case only with knows it, and so on ad infi nitum, but in each case only with almost perfect certainty. We show that if any mechanism can achieve truthful revelation perfect certainty. We show that if any mechanism can achieve truthful revelation as an equilibrium under common knowledge, then under approximate common as an equilibrium under common knowledge, then under approximate common knowledge, there must also exist an equilibrium with nontruthful revelation. In knowledge, there must also exist an equilibrium with nontruthful revelation. In other words, the above types of mechanisms are fragile in the sense that they depend other words, the above types of mechanisms are fragile in the sense that they depend crucially on delicate assumptions about higher-order beliefs. crucially on delicate assumptions about higher-order beliefs.
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Of course, the existence of common knowledge or approximate common Of course, the existence of common knowledge or approximate common knowledge can have large effects on bargaining as well. Thus, an interesting direcknowledge can have large effects on bargaining as well. Thus, an interesting direction for future research is to explore how an incomplete contracts/property rights tion for future research is to explore how an incomplete contracts/property rights model is affected by aspects of common knowledge, revelation mechanisms, and model is affected by aspects of common knowledge, revelation mechanisms, and bargaining under asymmetric information. It seems plausible that these issues could bargaining under asymmetric information. It seems plausible that these issues could lead to other reasons for ineffi ciency in investment, and property rights in the form lead to other reasons for ineffi ciency in investment, and property rights in the form of asset ownership may help to alleviate these ineffi ciencies. of asset ownership may help to alleviate these ineffi ciencies.
Back to Asymmetric Information? Back to Asymmetric Information?
We have just argued that dynamic revelation mechanisms lose bite when We have just argued that dynamic revelation mechanisms lose bite when moving only slightly away from common knowledge, thus, in particular, they lose moving only slightly away from common knowledge, thus, in particular, they lose bite when introducing only small amounts of private information. Now, consider bite when introducing only small amounts of private information. Now, consider the polar case where the valuation of the good is private information of the buyer. the polar case where the valuation of the good is private information of the buyer. As before, As before, B and and S trade a single unit of an indivisible object. Time is discrete, trade a single unit of an indivisible object. Time is discrete, with an investment period 0 and two consumption periods 1 and 2, and both with an investment period 0 and two consumption periods 1 and 2, and both players have a common discount factor players have a common discount factor δ δ. In each period, . In each period, S makes a price offer makes a price offer to to B, which can be accepted or rejected, and asset ownership may provide which can be accepted or rejected, and asset ownership may provide S with with an outside option (such as being able to consume or sell to another buyer) an outside option (such as being able to consume or sell to another buyer) s in in subsequent bargaining. Finally, suppose that the buyer's valuation subsequent bargaining. Finally, suppose that the buyer's valuation θ θ, which can be , which can be high or low, respectively high or low, respectively _ _ v or or _ _ v , is private information of the buyer. In the absence , is private information of the buyer. In the absence of an outside option, we know from existing dynamic screening models (for of an outside option, we know from existing dynamic screening models (for example, see Bolton and Dewatripont, 2004) , that if the seller's prior belief is that example, see Bolton and Dewatripont, 2004) , that if the seller's prior belief is that the buyer's valuation is high with suffi ciently high probability, then it is optimal the buyer's valuation is high with suffi ciently high probability, then it is optimal for the seller to sell with probability less than one in period 1 at price for the seller to sell with probability less than one in period 1 at price p = = _ _ v in in the fi rst period in order to credibly continue to set the fi rst period in order to credibly continue to set p = = _ _ v in the second period. in the second period. However, this trade restriction becomes unnecessary once the outside option is However, this trade restriction becomes unnecessary once the outside option is introduced. More precisely, one can show that if the outside option lies strictly introduced. More precisely, one can show that if the outside option lies strictly between between _ _ v and and _ _ v , introducing the outside option leads to the following being the , introducing the outside option leads to the following being the unique equilibrium: the seller sets unique equilibrium: the seller sets p = = _ _ v in period 1 and sells with probability one in period 1 and sells with probability one to a consumer that accepts a purchase at that price; otherwise, the seller exerts the to a consumer that accepts a purchase at that price; otherwise, the seller exerts the outside option in period 2. To see this, note fi rst that in period 2, if the seller does outside option in period 2. To see this, note fi rst that in period 2, if the seller does not exert the outside option, then the only credible alternative is to sell at price not exert the outside option, then the only credible alternative is to sell at price p = = _ _ v , which is dominated by , which is dominated by S exerting the outside option. Now, moving back to exerting the outside option. Now, moving back to period 1, anticipating that the seller will exert the outside option for sure if the period 1, anticipating that the seller will exert the outside option for sure if the buyer refuses the offer at buyer refuses the offer at p = = _ _ v in period 1, a in period 1, a _ _ v -type buyer will accept this offer -type buyer will accept this offer for sure. Overall, ownership rights that guarantee the seller an outside option for sure. Overall, ownership rights that guarantee the seller an outside option between between _ _ v and and _ _ v both reduce the scope for trade ineffi ciency (in period 1) and both reduce the scope for trade ineffi ciency (in period 1) and enhance the seller's investment incentives (in period 0). enhance the seller's investment incentives (in period 0).
Most incomplete contracts models follow the lead of Grossman and Hart Most incomplete contracts models follow the lead of Grossman and Hart (1986) in assuming symmetric information at the bargaining stage so that the Nash (1986) in assuming symmetric information at the bargaining stage so that the Nash bargaining solution can be used, which simplifi es the analysis. This subsection bargaining solution can be used, which simplifi es the analysis. This subsection suggests, however, that allowing for asymmetric information at the bargaining stage suggests, however, that allowing for asymmetric information at the bargaining stage may provide an alternative and also tractable approach to the role of ownership. may provide an alternative and also tractable approach to the role of ownership. 8 8
Contracts as Reference Points? Contracts as Reference Points?
In another attempt at responding to the Maskin-Tirole criticism, Hart and In another attempt at responding to the Maskin-Tirole criticism, Hart and Moore (2008) develop a model of contracts as "reference points." In their model, Moore (2008) develop a model of contracts as "reference points." In their model, contracting parties can agree on some aspects of performance but not on others. contracting parties can agree on some aspects of performance but not on others. For example, it might be possible to agree on a contract to paint a house but not For example, it might be possible to agree on a contract to paint a house but not necessarily on whether the painting of the house is done in a timely manner. In necessarily on whether the painting of the house is done in a timely manner. In their terminology, performance could be "consummate" (I paint your house, their terminology, performance could be "consummate" (I paint your house, and quickly) or "perfunctory" (I paint it, but I take my time). In this incomplete and quickly) or "perfunctory" (I paint it, but I take my time). In this incomplete contracting approach, only perfunctory performance is enforceable by a court or contracting approach, only perfunctory performance is enforceable by a court or third party, while consummate performance is noncontractible. third party, while consummate performance is noncontractible. Suppose consummate rather than perfunctory performance is slightly more Suppose consummate rather than perfunctory performance is slightly more costly for the party performing the service but much more valuable to the party costly for the party performing the service but much more valuable to the party receiving the service. To extend the house-painting example, say that I have to receiving the service. To extend the house-painting example, say that I have to vacate my house or suffer substantial disruption while it is being painted, but you, vacate my house or suffer substantial disruption while it is being painted, but you, the painter, have little other work to do. Suppose that the party performing the the painter, have little other work to do. Suppose that the party performing the service values being treated "well" and will perform consummately if treated "well." service values being treated "well" and will perform consummately if treated "well." Hart and Moore (2008) assume that being treated well is equivalent to a party Hart and Moore (2008) assume that being treated well is equivalent to a party getting that to which the party feels entitled. This sense of entitlement creates getting that to which the party feels entitled. This sense of entitlement creates a reference point, which in turn creates the possibility of one or another party a reference point, which in turn creates the possibility of one or another party feeling "aggrieved." feeling "aggrieved."
Suppose the Suppose the B(uyer) of the service values it at 20, but it costs the (uyer) of the service values it at 20, but it costs the S(eller) 10 to (eller) 10 to provide. provide. B believes that there are lots of sellers like believes that there are lots of sellers like S-they are a-dime-a-dozen, and -they are a-dime-a-dozen, and hence hence B feels entitled to pay no more than 10. Similarly, feels entitled to pay no more than 10. Similarly, S thinks that there are a lot thinks that there are a lot of potential buyers, and feels entitled to be paid what his or her services are worth of potential buyers, and feels entitled to be paid what his or her services are worth to the buyers. But both are smart enough to realize that once they enter into an to the buyers. But both are smart enough to realize that once they enter into an agreement they are in bilateral monopoly, or as Williamson (1979) puts it, the relaagreement they are in bilateral monopoly, or as Williamson (1979) puts it, the relationship undergoes a "fundamental transformation." tionship undergoes a "fundamental transformation." B feels entitled to pay a price of feels entitled to pay a price of 10, and 10, and S feels entitled to receive a price of 20. Despite these feelings of entitlement, feels entitled to receive a price of 20. Despite these feelings of entitlement, both both B and and S realize there are gains from trade at any price between 10 and 20. But realize there are gains from trade at any price between 10 and 20. But both both B and and S will become more perfunctory and hence less consummate as the price will become more perfunctory and hence less consummate as the price moves away from their entitlement point. moves away from their entitlement point. Hart and Moore (2008) go on to show how shading induced by reference points Hart and Moore (2008) go on to show how shading induced by reference points can provide a rationale for simple ownership contracts. The point here is twofold: can provide a rationale for simple ownership contracts. The point here is twofold: First, this theory is immune to the earlier critique that perhaps properly designed First, this theory is immune to the earlier critique that perhaps properly designed revelation mechanisms can overcome the problem of incomplete contracts, because revelation mechanisms can overcome the problem of incomplete contracts, because mechanisms do not affect reference points. Second, the ineffi ciency that arises here mechanisms do not affect reference points. Second, the ineffi ciency that arises here does not take the form of underinvestment because either side would fear signing does not take the form of underinvestment because either side would fear signing a contract, but instead it takes the form of underperformance because of feeling a contract, but instead it takes the form of underperformance because of feeling aggrieved after the contract is signed. aggrieved after the contract is signed.
Of course, a model of incomplete contracting and property rights based on Of course, a model of incomplete contracting and property rights based on reference points and the potential for feeling aggrieved raises a number of quesreference points and the potential for feeling aggrieved raises a number of questions: From where does the reference point come, and how can this be pinned tions: From where does the reference point come, and how can this be pinned down? Can the reference point change from the time of contracting to the time of down? Can the reference point change from the time of contracting to the time of performance, perhaps if market conditions change? How applicable is this theory performance, perhaps if market conditions change? How applicable is this theory to sophisticated parties, including many fi rms? Again, these seem like fruitful topics to sophisticated parties, including many fi rms? Again, these seem like fruitful topics for future research. for future research.
Cognition and Endogenous Incomplete Contracts Cognition and Endogenous Incomplete Contracts
Another recent development of the incomplete contracts paradigm has been Another recent development of the incomplete contracts paradigm has been to endogenize the degree of contractual incompleteness, in particular by analyzing to endogenize the degree of contractual incompleteness, in particular by analyzing how the equilibrium level of contractual incompleteness may depend upon determihow the equilibrium level of contractual incompleteness may depend upon determinants such as the parties' cognitive (or learning) ability; discount rates; the parties' nants such as the parties' cognitive (or learning) ability; discount rates; the parties' ability to also rely upon relational contracting, bargaining powers, and competiability to also rely upon relational contracting, bargaining powers, and competition; or other variables that affect the extent of the hold-up problem between the tion; or other variables that affect the extent of the hold-up problem between the contracting parties. These papers are often referred to as the second-generation contracting parties. These papers are often referred to as the second-generation models of incomplete contracts. models of incomplete contracts.
As a prominent example, here we summarize the argument in Tirole (2009). As a prominent example, here we summarize the argument in Tirole (2009).
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Consider two parties, a buyer and a seller, who contract over the delivery of a good. Consider two parties, a buyer and a seller, who contract over the delivery of a good. The standard specifi cation of the good, over which there is common knowledge The standard specifi cation of the good, over which there is common knowledge among the two parties, is denoted among the two parties, is denoted A. However, it may turn out that . However, it may turn out that A does not suit does not suit the buyer after the contract is signed and that some alternative specifi cation the buyer after the contract is signed and that some alternative specifi cation A′ ′, , which is a priori undescribable in the initial contract, does the job instead. Moving which is a priori undescribable in the initial contract, does the job instead. Moving from from A to to A′ ′ after the contract has been signed entails an extra cost, but doing so after the contract has been signed entails an extra cost, but doing so is assumed to be effi cient because it increases the buyer's valuation by more than is assumed to be effi cient because it increases the buyer's valuation by more than enough to offset the costs. enough to offset the costs.
The seller has the possibility of holding up this renegotiation until it appropriThe seller has the possibility of holding up this renegotiation until it appropriates part of the gain from renegotiation. To avoid having to incur that hold-up ates part of the gain from renegotiation. To avoid having to incur that hold-up cost, before the contract is signed, the buyer may decide to invest in cognitive cost, before the contract is signed, the buyer may decide to invest in cognitive effort to learn whether alternative effort to learn whether alternative A′ ′ is appropriate. If the buyer fi nds out that is appropriate. If the buyer fi nds out that A′ ′ is is appropriate, then the buyer will disclose this to the seller at the contracting stage appropriate, then the buyer will disclose this to the seller at the contracting stage (because this avoids incurring a later adjustment cost and avoids the need for a (because this avoids incurring a later adjustment cost and avoids the need for a hold-up premium paid to the seller). Otherwise, if the buyer does not fi nd out hold-up premium paid to the seller). Otherwise, if the buyer does not fi nd out about about A′ ′ and yet and yet A′ ′ turns out to be appropriate, renegotiation and the adjustment turns out to be appropriate, renegotiation and the adjustment cost are unavoidable. cost are unavoidable.
In this model, contractual incompleteness is measured by the equilibrium In this model, contractual incompleteness is measured by the equilibrium probability that the buyer learns about probability that the buyer learns about A′ ′. Interestingly, even if the adjustment cost . Interestingly, even if the adjustment cost of actually changing the product was zero, the buyer has an incentive to invest in of actually changing the product was zero, the buyer has an incentive to invest in cognition, namely to avoid hold-up by the seller at the renegotiation stage. In this cognition, namely to avoid hold-up by the seller at the renegotiation stage. In this kind of model, contractual completeness will increase with the adjustment cost (the kind of model, contractual completeness will increase with the adjustment cost (the higher the adjustment cost, the higher the scope for hold-up by the seller); increase higher the adjustment cost, the higher the scope for hold-up by the seller); increase with the seller's bargaining power (the higher that bargaining power, the higher the with the seller's bargaining power (the higher that bargaining power, the higher the scope for hold-up by the seller); or decrease with the seller's patience (or the seller's scope for hold-up by the seller); or decrease with the seller's patience (or the seller's attachment to relational contracting with the buyer). attachment to relational contracting with the buyer).
Concluding Remarks Concluding Remarks
In this essay, we have focused attention on theoretical debates around the In this essay, we have focused attention on theoretical debates around the incomplete contracts/property rights approach, but we would be remiss not to incomplete contracts/property rights approach, but we would be remiss not to add that this theory has also spurred an empirical literature on fi rms' boundaries add that this theory has also spurred an empirical literature on fi rms' boundaries and organization. For example, Grossman and Hart (1986) predict underinvestand organization. For example, Grossman and Hart (1986) predict underinvestment by parties that do not have ownership (and hence residual control rights). ment by parties that do not have ownership (and hence residual control rights). Acemoglu, Aghion, Griffi th, and Zilibotti (2010) use U.K. fi rm-level panel data Acemoglu, Aghion, Griffi th, and Zilibotti (2010) use U.K. fi rm-level panel data and input-output information about U.K. fi rms to show that more vertically inteand input-output information about U.K. fi rms to show that more vertically integrated fi rms-fi rms that produce a higher fraction of their inputs in-house-also grated fi rms-fi rms that produce a higher fraction of their inputs in-house-also display higher R&D investment by fi nal producers and lower R&D investment by display higher R&D investment by fi nal producers and lower R&D investment by supplying industries. supplying industries.
In another example of how ownership can address incomplete contracts, in In another example of how ownership can address incomplete contracts, in the trucking industry, one ownership form is for the driver to own the truck directly, the trucking industry, one ownership form is for the driver to own the truck directly, while another form is for a trucking company to own the truck and to hire the driver while another form is for a trucking company to own the truck and to hire the driver as an employee. Baker and Hubbard (2004) fi nd that driver ownership provides an as an employee. Baker and Hubbard (2004) fi nd that driver ownership provides an incentive to take care of the truck but means that the dispatcher will underinvest incentive to take care of the truck but means that the dispatcher will underinvest in planning how the truck should be used (in particular, in fi nding return trips to in planning how the truck should be used (in particular, in fi nding return trips to utilize capacity). It would be tricky to draw up an enforceable contract on either of utilize capacity). It would be tricky to draw up an enforceable contract on either of these points: taking excellent care of the truck, or using the capacity of a truck as these points: taking excellent care of the truck, or using the capacity of a truck as effi ciently as possible. Thus, Baker and Hubbard fi nd that driver ownership is more effi ciently as possible. Thus, Baker and Hubbard fi nd that driver ownership is more prevalent in long-haul settings, where truck maintenance is more important and prevalent in long-haul settings, where truck maintenance is more important and where fi nding a return back-haul load is more likely. They also fi nd that a technowhere fi nding a return back-haul load is more likely. They also fi nd that a technological shock-the introduction of onboard computers which can help monitor how logical shock-the introduction of onboard computers which can help monitor how well the truck is taken care of-leads to a decrease in driver ownership. Lafontaine well the truck is taken care of-leads to a decrease in driver ownership. Lafontaine and Slade (2007) In their analysis of delegation of authority within fi rms, Acemoglu, Aghion, In their analysis of delegation of authority within fi rms, Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, Van Reenen, and Zilibotti (2007) use U.K. and French fi rm-level panel Lelarge, Van Reenen, and Zilibotti (2007) use U.K. and French fi rm-level panel data to show that more technologically advanced fi rms, more technology-intensive data to show that more technologically advanced fi rms, more technology-intensive fi rms, younger fi rms, or fi rms that differ more (for example, in terms of inputfi rms, younger fi rms, or fi rms that differ more (for example, in terms of inputoutput) from other fi rms in the same industry, tend to delegate authority more output) from other fi rms in the same industry, tend to delegate authority more than other fi rms. Delegation of authority is measured either by the extent to which than other fi rms. Delegation of authority is measured either by the extent to which downstream units are organized as profi t centers or by the extent to which middle downstream units are organized as profi t centers or by the extent to which middle managers have been eliminated. This in turn is consistent with Aghion and Tirole's managers have been eliminated. This in turn is consistent with Aghion and Tirole's (1997) idea that delegating authority allows headquarters to induce more informa-(1997) idea that delegating authority allows headquarters to induce more information gathering by downstream agents. tion gathering by downstream agents.
As an example of how ownership structures of fi rms may evolve, Kaplan and As an example of how ownership structures of fi rms may evolve, Kaplan and Stromberg (2003) Aghion and Bolton (1992) , they fi nd that venture capitalists tend to In line with Aghion and Bolton (1992) , they fi nd that venture capitalists tend to relinquish control as fi rms mature and thus accumulate wealth that can be used as relinquish control as fi rms mature and thus accumulate wealth that can be used as collateral. Forbes and Lederman (2009) use data on the performance of regional collateral. Forbes and Lederman (2009) use data on the performance of regional airlines under different ownership structures (owned by a major airline or subconairlines under different ownership structures (owned by a major airline or subcontracted). They fi nd large positive effects of ownership on measures such as on-time tracted). They fi nd large positive effects of ownership on measures such as on-time departures. Moreover, they use instrumental variable techniques to obtain a plaudepartures. Moreover, they use instrumental variable techniques to obtain a plausibly causal inference. sibly causal inference.
We opened by noting that Coase (1937) asked a great question: if markets are We opened by noting that Coase (1937) asked a great question: if markets are so effi cient, why do fi rms exist? So did Grossman and Hart (1986) when they began so effi cient, why do fi rms exist? So did Grossman and Hart (1986) when they began their paper with, "What is a fi rm?" As with Coase's question, it will take economists their paper with, "What is a fi rm?" As with Coase's question, it will take economists time to arrive at a fully satisfactory answer. But in the process, we have come to time to arrive at a fully satisfactory answer. But in the process, we have come to better understand what determines the size and boundaries of fi rms, their capital better understand what determines the size and boundaries of fi rms, their capital structure, their internal organizational structure, the importance of intrafi rm trade structure, their internal organizational structure, the importance of intrafi rm trade in international trade, the role of government ownership, and more. And we have in international trade, the role of government ownership, and more. And we have also learned from recent debates on the foundations of incomplete contract theory. also learned from recent debates on the foundations of incomplete contract theory. Indeed, these debates have led to a new generation of incomplete contracts models Indeed, these debates have led to a new generation of incomplete contracts models that generate predictions on the very determinants of contractual incompleteness. that generate predictions on the very determinants of contractual incompleteness. May the next 25 years be as fruitful. May the next 25 years be as fruitful.
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